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Various large-value interbank payment networks employ different rules for
settling of interbank payments.
1 Some networks such as the Swiss Interbank Clearing
(SIC) network operate under real-time gross settlement (RTGS). That is, payment
messages entered into the payments network are continuously cleared and settled by
transfer of reserve funds from the paying bank to the receiving bank. Other networks,
such as the Clearing House Interbank Payment Network (CHIPS),
2 operate under net
settlement rules. That is, at the close of each business day, the value of all payments due
to and due from each bank in the network is calculated on a net basis. Banks ending the
day in a net debit position (banks whose due-tos exceed their due-froms) transfer reserves
to the network. The network, in turn, transfers these reserve funds to net creditor banks.
3
The allocation of intraday credit in large-value net settlement networks is of
policy concern, given the very large flows associated with these networks. The average
gross daily volume of payments over CHIPS, for example, is easily over $1 trillion, and
Schoenmaker (1995, p. 21) puts average peak daily net debit positions on CHIPS at
roughly $50 billion. To give some perspective on these numbers, consider that annual
GDP for the United States is roughly $7.5 trillion, and that overnight reserve balances
held by commercial banks at the Fed (i.e., the total of all non-currency reserves) averages
roughly $15 billion.
In policy circles, it has often been argued that net settlement of interbank
payments can reduce the riskiness of interbank payment systems.
4  Formal analyses of
this question have concluded that the real result is not a reduction but a reallocation of
1 For a survey of large-value payment systems in the G-10 counties, see Bank for International Settlements
(1993) or Folkerts-Landau, Garber, and Schoenmaker (1996).
2 CHIPS is operated by the New York Clearing House Association. Payments on CHIPS are most com-
monly associated with the dollar legs of foreign exchange transactions. See Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (1991) or New York Clearing House Association (1995) on the operation of CHIPS.
3 Other sets of rules for clearing and settlement are possible. For example, the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire
system is nominally a real-time gross settlement system, since all payment messages immediately become
liabilities of the Federal Reserve System and therefore equivalent to reserve money. However, the Fedwire
system resembles a net settlement system in the sense that participating banks are allowed to overdraft their
accounts and have access to (subject to certain limits) free daylight credit. See Federal Reserve Bank of
New York (1995) for details on the operation of Fedwire.
4 See for example, the discussion on pp. 2-3 “Lamfalussy Report” of the Bank for International Settlements
(1990).
3risk, away from the banking system and towards either the government as guarantor of
the payments system, deposit insurance facilities, or the public.
5 It follows that
investigations of the relative merits of various settlement procedures should consider the
effect that these procedures have on overall riskiness associated with a payments network,
not on riskiness for a particular subset of the network participants.
In our analysis, we show that changes in the overall riskiness of interbank
payment networks will be tied to changes in the banks’ behavior induced by various rules
for settlement. In particular, we examine the effects of settlement rules on banks’
tendencies to honor interbank commitments (“net due-tos”) rather than default. Small
variations in settlement rules can result in significant changes in bank incentives and
ultimately bank behavior.
At the most basic level, the tradeoff between net and real-time gross settlement
can be characterized as a tradeoff between two distortions.
6 Net settlement increases
default probability and thereby the costs associated with potential defaults, while gross
settlement increases the costs associated with holding non-interest-bearing reserves. The
relative merits of the two systems will depend on the relative size of these two costs.
Different weighings of these costs as viewed by bank regulators and by banks can lead to
different conclusions about optimality of particular settlement rules, and thus may explain
the current lack of consensus on this issue.
We examine the tradeoff between these two distortions using the continuous-time
inventory model described in Harrison (1985). This framework is particularly convenient
for this problem because it provides tractable probability distributions for banks’ net posi-
tions (under net settlement) and liquidity demands (under RTGS). This framework also
allows us to analytically calculate the effects of placing upper limits (“caps”) on banks’
net debit positions. This is a relevant calculation because net debit caps are employed in
all real-world payment networks that settle on a net basis.
5 See Emmons (1995a) and Freixas and Parigi (1996).
6 This view of net versus gross settlement is in accord with policy-related discussions on this issue and the
related literature (see below). There is another view of net settlement which emphasizes the effects of
replacing gross contractual obligations with netted obligations (i.e., “netting by novation;” see e.g., Green
1996).
4Our main conclusions are as follows. First, for the simplest case, where bank
asset quality is fixed and bank assets can always be liquidated at book value, we find net
settlement always dominates real-time gross settlement. However, the optimal net
settlement scheme may be one which necessarily involves some probability of default.
Second, we find that net settlement becomes even more attractive if bank assets have to
be liquidated at less than book value. Third, when we examine the case where the quality
of bank assets is a choice variable, we find that the potential costs of net settlement rise
due to negative effects on bank asset quality.
I. Literature Review
Angelini and Giannini (1994) present a systematic comparison of the tradeoffs be-
tween the costs of liquidity versus the costs associated with defaults under net settlement.
Under the assumption that the risk of a bank failure rises monotonically with the interval
between settlements, they derive an optimal settlement interval for a net settlement
system. Using a similar approach, Schoenmaker (1994, 1995) compares the costs
associated with real-time gross and net settlement of interbank payments, based on the
costs associated with settlement failure (bank defaults), the opportunity costs of collateral
holdings by the banks in the network, and “gridlock” or payment delay costs associated
with gross settlement or higher collateral requirements. Using “macro” level data on
payment flows through two large-value U.S. interbank payments networks (CHIPS and
Fedwire), Schoenmaker concludes that for these networks, cost of real-time gross
settlement (without free daylight overdrafts) would probably outweigh the reduction in
the risks associated with bank failures. However, these analyses assume that the
probability of default is exogenous to the structure and settlement rules of the network.
Furfine and Stehm (1996) analyze this issue from a different perspective. They
consider the problem of a payments network which operates as a RTGS system, where
intraday credit is extended by a central bank. The central bank’s optimal credit policy is
based on balancing the costs of stricter credit policies (gridlock and collateral costs) and
against the costs of more liberal credit policies (defaults), where these costs are
5incorporated into nonstochastic functions. The optimal credit policy then depends on the
relative weights associated with each type of cost.
Emmons (1995a) builds a microeconomic underpinning for interbank net settle-
ment systems, by emphasizing cost savings resulting from minimization of the demand
for non-interest-bearing reserves, and from the scale economies associated with costly
state verification and delegated monitoring in the case of bank failures. He cautions,
however, that the cost savings associated with each of these “natural monopolies” (i.e., in
settling payments and in liquidation of failed banks) is unlikely to be realized under
current institutional arrangements. Emmons (1995b) extends this framework to
investigate the effects of net settlement in terms of risk shifting from other network
participants to the deposit insurer and other bank creditors.
Freixas and Parigi (1996) analyze characteristics of net versus gross settlement, by
considering a model in which gross settlement corresponds to an interbank settlement in
reserves, and net settlement corresponds to settlement in debt claims. In the version of
their model in where there is full information concerning the quality of bank assets, net
settlement dominates. However, in the version of the model where there is private infor-
mation concerning banks’ asset values, net settlement can lead to the risk of “contagion,”
- i.e., the risk that a failure of one bank can spread to another.
7 The issue of contagion is
also taken up in a related paper by Rochet and Tirole (1995), who build a model of
interbank lending in order to analyze the effects of government safety-net programs on
bank’s incentives to monitor each other’s asset quality.
In contrast to the last two papers, we will abstract from issues of contagion in the
analysis below. We argue that while contagion is interesting and important, for most
present-day payment networks, the high likelihood of regulatory intervention in the event
of potential settlement failures insures that the probability of contagion will be virtually
zero.
8 Thus it makes sense to concentrate first on the problem of the costs associated with
7 Kahn and Roberds (1996) present a related model, in which settlement via bank debt is only welfare-
enhancing to the extent such debt can be collateralized.
8 In the case of CHIPS and other privately operated payment networks, it should be emphasized that there
are no explicit guarantees of settlement from the Fed or any other central bank. However, the perception
that such private networks can be “too big to fail” is common among private sector observers. See for




Alternatively, one could interpret our analysis of “net-settlement” as
settlement systems that grant interest-free, uncollateralized daylight
II. A Model of Interbank Settlement
Many of the critical differences between net and gross settlement systems can be
illustrated in the context of a simple example. In this setup, banks exist for a single
“trading day.” A representative bank in an interbank payments network can hold three
types of assets: A “earning assets,” M “reserves,” and payments due from other banks or
“due-froms” DF; it holds two types of liabilities, payments due to other banks or “due-
tos” DT, and C “deposits.” By assumption, due-to positions cannot be collateralized.
A bank starts the day at time zero with only earning assets A and deposits C.
During the course of the day, due-froms and due-tos will accumulate exogenously
according to the demands of depositors. No delay is permitted: as soon as a bank receives
instruction from a depositor to make a payment, the payment message must be entered
into the payment network, or the bank will be in default.
9
We will take as a legal restriction that net due-to positions must be settled by
transfer of reserves. There is no legal reserve requirement. Instead, reserves will be
purchased and/or accumulate as needed according to the settlement rules of the payment
system. Under real-time gross settlement, for example, banks continually pay off net
due-tos as they are realized. Initially we assume that bank assets have constant value
over the trading day and that they can be exchanged for reserves at book value.
10
However, the market for reserves is imperfect in the sense that reserves accumulated
during the day cannot be exchanged for earning assets during the day, but must be held
overnight without receiving interest. We use the assumption that reserves cannot be
reinvested during the day as a convenient approximation for the non-existence of a
International Settlement (1996, pp. 6-8), which describes the resolution of four recent potential liquidity
crises associated with foreign exchange markets, in each case without incidence of contagion.
9 Some of the studies cited above have analyzed the costs associated with the delay of payments. In our
model, allowing for delay of payments would only introduce an additional dimension of moral hazard and
would be unlikely to change the qualitative nature of our results.
7continuous auction market in reserves.
11 Note also that reserves accumulated during the
day can be used to settle due-tos realized during the day. The “social” cost of holding
reserves is the seignorage cost or implicit tax of  r >0 per dollar of reserves held at the end
of the day. We assume that these seignorage costs are passed on to depositors.
12
The finality of reserves transfers will be the key factor in reducing the bank’s in-
centive to declare bankruptcy. In other words, settling interbank claims by transferring
reserves to other banks irreversibly commits the bank to favor interbank claims on its as-
sets over all others. We will take this “irreversibility” feature of reserves transfers as a
given institutional feature of the model environment.
13
Below we will calculate the optimal size of net debit caps for various environ-
ments. These calculations assume that the level of initial asset holdings are observable
and known at the time decisions are made concerning the size of net debit caps, and that
the size of the caps cannot subsequently be changed during the trading day. This
assumption has some basis in real-world practice. Net debit caps on CHIPS, for example,
can be in most circumstances be changed only during a twenty-minute interval before the
opening of business.
14 It would be easy to extend this model to situations in which the
level of asset holdings by a bank is a random variable unknown to other parties at the
instant in which debit caps are set.
10These assumptions are relaxed in Section IV.
11This assumption is also consistent with Stigum’s (1990, pp. 537-74) description of the operation of the
market for reserves (fed funds) in the U.S. In particular, Stigum notes (p. 550) that “...if a bank that is
normally a net buyer of funds accumulates a big surplus position, it may have difficulty working off that
surplus because it has insufficient lines to sell it.”
12Here we use the nominal rate times reserve holdings as a first-order approximation for the welfare costs
of inflation that could be derived in a more complete model, e.g., as in Freeman (1996). The assumption
that the inflation tax can be passed on to depositors simplifies the analysis by allowing us to do separate
calculations of banks’ reserve holdings and their net worth. This assumption is consistent with a legal
restriction against paying interest on demand deposits, coupled with a restriction that funds received during
the day must be held overnight as demand deposits.
13We note that this assumption is consistent with current U.S. institutions. Transfers of reserves via
Fedwire immediately become liabilities of the Federal Reserve System; see Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (1995, p. 11). In the words of Corrigan (1990, p. 131), “...the money in question is ‘good money’
even if at the next instant the sending institution goes bust.”
14See New York Clearing House Association (1995, p.26).
8A bank’s decision to default is made on the basis of profit maximization. The net
worth of a bank if it does not declare bankruptcy is the value of its assets minus its liabili-
ties, i.e.,
NW = A + DF + M - C - DT
i.e.,
value of a bank’s assets, but it also allows the bank to partially shift priority away from
other banks participating in the payments network. Under this assumption, bankruptcy
disproportionately punishes holders of interbank claims, implying that bankruptcy is a
tempting option for banks with a large net debit position relative to their capital.
15
End-of-day default under net settlement occurs if net worth under bankruptcy ex-
ceeds net worth under normal settlement, which is equivalent to
least as great as the value of assets lost from the defaulting bank. However, the total cost
of default may also include additional costs, such as the costs of payment system disrup-
tions.
We now consider a discrete-time example in which the day is divided into three
periods, 0 (morning), 1 (noon) and 2 (close of business). The intraday evolution of net
due-tos is stochastic. We assume that there is an equal probability of depositors receiving
15Note that banks need not literally have positive net worth in the bankruptcy state in order for this
incentive to exist. A similar incentive could exist if bankruptcy favored a select group of bank creditors.
Such inequities in bankruptcy priority could result from political considerations, e.g., if the failing bank is
based in one country while the payment network is based in another, or from statutory provisions favoring
certain depositors over other creditors.
9C/2 in funds or wishing to send C/2 in funds in the morning and again in the afternoon.
Thus
We choose parameter values so that a bank with C in net due-tos finds it advantageous to
default, but a bank with C/2 in net due-tos does not. This means that
(1)
Under RTGS banks pay off net due-tos as they are realized. They do so by selling
earning assets in return for reserves. Hence if the bank incurs a net due to the position of C/2
in period 1, it must immediately liquidate C/2 worth of earning assets. This implies that
the bank’s maximum net due-to position in period 2 will be C/2, which in turn implies
that the bank will have no incentive to default in either period (the evolution of the bank’s
net position under RTGS is shown in Figure 1).
To verify this claim, consider the bank’s situation if it arrives in period 2 holding
A-C/2 in net assets and facing a due-to position of C/2. If it defaults its net worth is
which under (1) is less than A-C, which is its net worth if it settles. Since its net worth is
therefore A-C in period 2, regardless of the due-tos that arrive in period 2, it has no inter-
est in defaulting in period 1 if its due-to position is C/2.
Since there is no possibility of bankruptcy under real-time gross settlement, the
expected social costs under RTGS are simply the seignorage costs times the expected re-
serve holdings at the end of period 2. To evaluate this cost, consider the four equally
likely possibilities. If the bank pays out to other banks in each of the two periods it holds
no reserves in the final period. If the bank receives funds in each of the two periods it
holds reserves in an amount equal to C in the final period. If it receives funds in the first
period and pays in the second, it holds zero reserves. Finally, if it pays in the first period
10but receives funds in the second period it holds reserves equal to C/2. Thus the expected
level of reserve holdings is (3/8)C, and social costs are (3/8)Cr.
Under net settlement without net debit caps, the bank ends up with a period 2 net
debit position of C with probability 1/4 (see Figure 2). In this case the bank will default
under assumption (1). With probability 1/4 the bank ends up with a period 2 net credit
position of C, and with probability 1/2 the bank ends up with a zero net position. The so-
times the probability of default (1/4), plus the cost Cr of holding reserves at the end of the
day times the probability of ending the day in a net credit position, i.e., 1/4. The total so-
In the last calculation we have assumed that the failure of the representative bank
does not result in the failure of other banks participating in the payments network. In
other words, failure of a bank does not lead to a problem of systemic risk. This could
happen if either the failing bank’s due-to position were spread over a large number of
creditor banks, or if in the case of a default, the failing bank’s liabilities were assumed by
a private or governmental guarantor.
There are several points that can be made from this simple example. First, chang-
ing the rules from real-time gross to net settlement necessarily (though perhaps, weakly)
increases the risk of a settlement failure. Second, the social costs of a net settlement sys-
tem may be less than under gross settlement, even though net settlement can increase the
risk of a default. This can happen because net settlement reduces the seignorage costs as-
sociated with settlement. Obviously if strategic default were unavailable, then net settle-
ment would always dominate gross settlement, since net settlement would lessen
seignorage costs without increasing default risk. We do not regard this as a telling rejoin-
der to the relevance of the model: strategic default as modeled here is merely the
simplest form of moral hazard problem. More complicated forms of moral hazard, such
as choice of riskier investment, offering depositors early payment, and the like, will
generate similar costs, as long as interbank liability is limited in cases of default.
Finally, we note that a system of net settlement with a net debit cap D>0 offers
the possibility of some economization on reserve balances with reduced default
11decreases expected reserve holdings while eliminating bankruptcy. Therefore net
settlement with a net debit cap of D* dominates gross settlement, and indeed if
bankruptcy costs are greater than some critical level, this is the optimal net debit cap.
(Because of the discrete nature of this example, the optimal cap is constant for a wide
range of parameter values. In the continuous models of subsequent sections, we will
examine the effects of changing social cost parameters on optimal net debit caps.)
III. The Model with Continuous Payment Flows
We can better model the incentive problems faced by interbank payments
networks if we modify the setup of the previous section to allow for smooth evolution of
payment flows over the trading day. In this section, we will index time as a continuous
parameter t on the unit interval, where t = 0 indicates the start of the trading day and t = l
indicates the close of business. Net payment flows X(t) for a representative bank will
evolve as a driftless standard Brownian motion (see e.g., Harrison 1985, p. 1) over the unit
interval. This assumption is natural, if we regard each bank as small relative to the
overall size of the network, and if we regard individual payment orders as small relative
to the size of the bank. If either of these presumptions is grossly violated, a more
complicated process will be needed to model net payments.
l6
at any time t is equal to X(t). In the case of net settlement with net debit cap D, the net
debit position Z(t) at any time t is a regulated Brownian motion with upper control
barrier at D (Harrison, p. 14). The process Z(t) ranges over (-co, D] and may be
represented as
z(t) = X(t) - L(t)
16Also note that it would be feasible to bound the net payment process within finite “reflecting barriers,”
but that such a restriction would entail a considerable increase in the model’s mathematical complexity.
See, e.g., the computations in Appendix B of Bertola and Caballero (1994).
12where L(t) is defined as
The interpretation of L(t) is the total cumulated quantity of earning assets that must be
sold in order to keep the bank’s net debit position Z(s), below the cap D at all times
the cap is binding. Representative realizations of X(t), L(t), and Z(t) are shown in Fig-
ure 3 for the case where D = 0.
We begin our analysis by considering the social costs of real-time gross
settlement, which corresponds to a net debit cap D = 0. Under a net debit cap of zero it is
never in the interest of the bank to default as long as its net worth is positive. Since the
net worth of the bank remains constant as long as there is no cost to liquidating assets, no
default occurs under gross settlement. (This will change once we consider a cost to
liquidation of assets; see the following section.) Thus social costs of gross settlement are
proportional to the seignorage costs associated with the level of reserves the bank holds at
the end of the day. To calculate the level of reserve holdings at time 1, note that this level
equals –Z(t). Since D = 0, –Z(t) is a regulated Brownian motion with lower reflecting
tlement (per bank) is
To evaluate the social costs of net settlement, we again note that in this frame-
work, there is never a reason to default before the end of the trading day. Since liquida-
tion of assets imposes no penalty, there is no gain from early default. Early default is also
costly in the sense that it eliminates the option value of a firm waiting until the end to dis-
cover if there is an influx of net due tos to increase the firm’s holdings. Thus for net set-
tlement the social costs can be calculated by observing the costs associated with the
terminal position of the bank. For simplicity, we begin by considering net settlement
13without debit caps. The social cost consists of two components--one proportional to the
probability of default, and the other proportional to the expected holdings of reserves at
the end of the day. The expected holding of reserves is max{-Z(l),0}. As in the
For general values of  D, the social costs of net settlement involve identical
is given by
= 0 otherwise
Thus the social cost can in general be written as a function of D:
(2)
In short, equation (2) says that the total social cost of a settlement system is equal
to the sum of expected seignorage costs and expected costs associated with default. Note
that (2) presumes that seignorage costs do not vary depending on the fact of a default.
There are two equivalent ways of interpreting this assumption: first we measure
seignorage costs as the long-run costs of diverting funding from return-bearing assets in
order to make the payments system work. Second we imagine that in the event of a de-
fault the bank is immediately taken over by the network and depositors are made whole
but continue to bear the costs of the reserves used for the settling payments. This is con-
sistent with our abstraction from concerns about systemic risk.
ity of default. Moreover, increases in the debit cap reduce the expected seignorage cost.
settlement is always dominated by net settlement for small levels of the net debit cap, and
14Desirability of further increases in the net debit cap depends on the parameters of the
model. The following results describe this dependence.
Proposition 1.
seignorage charges, the optimal value of D decreases.
proposition holds (weakly) for either of the endpoints of this interval, so we restrict our
ditions for the minimization of SC* are given by
(3)
tions yield
as we increase the critical level of net debit
position for bankruptcy to be tempting, the optimal value of D increases.
Proof. Again restricting our attention to interior minima, standard comparative statics
calculations using conditions (3) yield
probability of default.
Proof. The first derivative of SC(D) is given by
15Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 & 2 characterize the socially optimal choice of net debit cap D,
where the socially optimal cap minimizes the sum of seignorage costs (borne by the
bank’s customers) and bankruptcy costs (which are borne by unspecified parties). If
some or all of the costs of default can be shifted to parties outside of the network,
conflicts may arise concerning the proper level of net debit cap.
To see this last point, suppose that all bankruptcy costs are borne by outside par-
ties. It is then easy to show that the true expected net worth of the representative bank in
the network is increasing in the net debit cap D. Denoting the “true” (as opposed to
Hence if D is large enough so that defaults can occur, the “true” time t = 0 expected net
worth of the bank can be calculated as
which simplifies to
(4)
Equation (4) says the true expected net worth of the bank is given by its notional net
Proposition 3. The true expected net worth
debit cap D.
with defaults. We can now show:
Proof: Restricting our attention to the nontrivial case where D is large enough to allow
defaults, differentiate (4) to obtain
16Q.E.D.
IV. Extensions
Changes in the Payments Process
We can extend this model to consider the effects of changes in the volume of
payments flows or changes in the intervals between settlement. Formally, we do this by
This implies that
at settlement time
increasing payments volume and/or settlement intervals on the optimal net debit cap
depend critically on the relative costs of the inflation tax and bankruptcy. The following
result describes this dependence.
Proof. Concentrating on interior minima, first- and second-order conditions for social
cost minimization are given by
17(5)
For the purpose of comparative statics calculation, it is convenient to define payments
Applying standard comparative static methods to (5) yields
Since the denominator of (6) is positive, the sign of (6) varies with its numerator, which
Q.E.D.
In words, Proposition 4 says that increased payments volume and/or longer settle-
ment intervals imply lower optimal net debit caps only when bankruptcy costs are small
relative to seignorage costs.
Liquidation Costs
So far we have assumed that a bank in need of reserves can instantaneously liqui-
date its assets at par in order to obtain reserves. This assumption has simplified the analy-
sis in several ways. The most important simplification is that there is no cost to the bank
from settling due-to positions during the day, so that default only was an issue at the end
of the trading period. A second implication was that there was no need to distinguish be-
tween the liquidity of various earning assets. We now drop the assumption of costless
liquidation. Instead we assume that banks start with two categories of earning assets in
18its mathematical complexity, we will confine our analysis to the two extreme cases:
gross settlement and net settlement without caps.
Under gross settlement, the net worth of the bank at any point during the day is
the difference between original net worth and the level of liquidity penalty paid for
reserves so far during the day. Recall that the total amount of reserves purchased as of
time t is given by L(t). Hence the total liquidation penalty paid as of time t is given by
worth is diminished. Net worth as of time t will be
Bankruptcy can occur if NW(t) is driven to zero, which will occur if
Note that under our assumptions NW(t) is nonincreasing so there is no chance
that a zero net-worth bank can be bailed out of bankruptcy. If asset value were stochastic,
then attempting to continue would have option value, so the analysis would be consid-
erably more complicated. Despite the fact that default can occur during the trading day,
the nonincreasing property of NW(t) implies that the probability of a default at some
occurred by time t = 1. Thus, the probability of a default at some time during the day is
given by
The last equality follows from the so-called “reflection principle,” which implies that for
Z (0) = 0 and a reflecting barrier of zero for Z(t), the processes L(t) and Z(t) have
identical distributions, even though their sample paths are almost surely different
(Harrison, p.14). Thus the expected costs associated with default in this environment are
during the day; however such adjustments are likely to be swamped by the costs of the
default occurring at all.
19The total social costs associated with the settlement regime have three compo-
nents, a seignorage cost, a liquidation cost, and a default cost. The total is
(7)
Note that in (7) we assume that liquidation penalties are not borne after the bank defaults.
In the case of net settlement, default occurs only at time 1; until then it is not necessary to
bear any liquidation costs. Default occurs when the bank’s net worth under default ex-
ceeds its net worth under normal settlement. The latter is
The former is
and so the critical value for default is identical to the value used in the previous section:
Thus social costs under a net settlement system are
(8)
correspond in this analogy, they are actually based on different quantities: under net set-
tlement, the liquidation decision depends on the bank’s net position at the end of the pe-
riod, whereas under gross settlement, liquidation costs depend on the history of accumu-
lated requirements for reserves.
We now consider the situations under which one or the other of these two are
more desirable. To do so we will assume the following parametric restriction:
(9)
17Here we have chosen assumptions on cost of liquidating in default to make this hold. Alternative as-
sumptions are possible and easily analyzed. Formally this could be done by simply incorporating addi-
20undertaken on the basis of one-for-one comparisons of a bank’s net debit position to its
capital.
18 Under assumption (9), difference between the costs of gross and net settlement
is given by
(10)
While the first three terms on the RHS of (10) are nonnegative, the sign of the last term is
ambiguous. Thus net settlement (without caps) does not always dominate gross settle-
ment. However, it is possible to show that imposing liquidation costs favors net settle-
ment in the following sense.
Proposition 5. Under restriction (9), for liquidation costs
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 implies that if net settlement (without caps) is preferred to gross set-
tlement without a liquidation penalty, a slight increase in this penalty increases the attrac-
tiveness of net settlement.
Settlement Rules and Bank Portfolio Choice
18In policy discussions it is common to directly compare a bank’s net debit cap with its capital position.
For example, the Fed’s caps on daylight credit over the Fedwire system are typically set at a fixed percent-
age of an institution’s risk-based capital. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1995, pp. 30-31).
21We extend the model to consider the interaction of various settlement rules and
bank portfolio decisions. We again divide portfolios between loans and bonds; and we
return to the assumption that all assets can be liquidated costlessly. Instead, we consider
the effect of differences in the riskiness of the two sorts of assets.
In this section, bonds are riskless and yield zero net return. That is, a portfolio of
worthless. With probability p the portfolio will turn out to be worth R(A2), where the
portfolio is subject to diminishing marginal returns.
We assume that on the night before (at time t = –1 ) the bank allocates its total as-
sets A between the loan and bond portfolios. It learns the realization of the return on the
loan portfolio in the morning before trading begins. The managers of the payments net-
work must set the rules of the settlement scheme without knowing either the bank’s port-
folio decision or the realization of the loan value.
In the absence of other considerations the optimal size of the loan portfolio would
overinvest in the risky portfolio. The main result of this section is that the use of net
settlement increases the temptation of firms to overinvest in risky portfolios.
19
To see this, let us set parametric restrictions on the function R so that in the ab-
sence of any participation in the payments network, the bank would have an incentive to
choose the efficient level of A2. The following condition is necessary and sufficient for
this to be the case:
19The idea that the “put option” feature of equity creates a conflict between equity-holders and creditors of
a firm is hardly new. For a general discussion of this idea and its relevance in banking environments, see
Flannery (1994). In this section, we show that to the extent that net settlement creates a new class of un-




Condition (11 ) says that, absent settlement considerations, the bank would choose
a level of investment in loans A2* that would leave the bank with positive net worth un-
der the bad investment outcome. By assumption, this level of investment is more profit-
able than the most profitable level of investment in loans, assuming that the bank has
negative net worth under the bad outcome.
Propositions 6 and 7 describe the effect of net and gross settlement on the bank’s
investment decision.
Proposition 6. Given condition (11), under real-time gross settlement the bank chooses
a loan portfolio of efficient size A2*.
Proof: Since there is no incentive to default under RTGS (see the discussion of Section
III), participation in the payments network cannot change a bank’s net worth. Hence, un-
der condition (11), the bank will choose a loan portfolio of efficient size. Q.E.D.
Proposition 7. Given condition (11), and given a net debit cap D large enough to allow
for default, under net settlement the bank chooses a loan portfolio of greater than effi-
cient size, and the size of the bank’s loan portfolio increases as the net debit cap in-
creases.
Proof: To show the first part of the proposition, we first show that the bank’s time t = 0
net worth
(12)
Now consider the bank’s time-zero notional net worth
investment outcomes
under successful and unsuccessful
23failure) analogously. The bank’s problem is to choose A2 at time t = -1 to maximize true
Which is equivalent to
(13)
must be the case that A2 > A2*. To verify that a solution to (13) represents a unique
maximum, consider the second-order condition
The first and last terms of the LHS of (14) are clearly negative, while the second term
Straightforward manipulation of conditions (13) and (14) implies
Q.E.D.
Corollary. The possibility of asset substitution reduces the optimal debit cap.
Proof: If banks can invest in risky loans, then social cost function (2) becomes
24and first- and second-order conditions (3) become
(15)
Comparative statics using conditions (15) yield
In words, Proposition 7 says that under net settlement, the option value of default
can cause banks to overinvest in risky assets. From the individual bank’s point of view, a
poor investment outcome can sometimes be mitigated by forcing other banks (or their
guarantors) to share in this loss. Proposition 6 says that under gross settlement, no such
incentive exists. Finally, the Corollary says that the optimal net debit cap must fall as a
result of these considerations.
V. Summary and Conclusion
Those whose primary concern is the leeway given to participants in interbank pay-
ments networks favor real-time gross settlement. However RTGS is expensive for banks,
who must retain large holdings of non-interest-bearing reserves and potentially face liqui-
dation costs in order to satisfy the liquidity demands of a RTGS system. This paper out-
lines the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits associated with net settlement
relative to RTGS. The costs of net settlement result from allowing banks the “put option”
of default on their interbank obligations, and from the resulting distortions in asset
holding decisions, while the benefits of net settlement result from saving on seignorage
and liquidation costs.
25In practice, default considerations represent a very small aspect of the decisions
made by banks in a payment network during the course of their day-to-day operations.
There are three justifications for concentrating on default as the decision that a bank con-
trols. First, when defaults do occur, they are likely to be expensive. Second, the default
decision is representative of many other decisions which a bank makes -- for example
more general portfolio decisions, the decision to allow depositors access to uncleared
funds and similar extensions of intraday credit, or the decision by a bank to delay the
sending of payment messages to other banks -- in which the actions are at best
imperfectly controlled by the managers of the payments network or governmental
regulators, but which have an impact on the overall risk associated with the network. For
all of these decisions, the conflict between the interest of an individual bank and
the “social” interest of the payments network are exacerbated by the bank’s holding a
large due-to position. Third, the default decision is very simple to analyze. The
framework we have developed can be usefully extended to consider the more complex
decisions which are of concern to both operators of private payments networks and to
governmental regulators.
Our results demonstrate the complexity of welfare comparisons between different
settlement rules, even in a very restrictive model environment. In the simplest case, with
no asset substitution and no liquidity costs, some form of net settlement dominates
(Proposition 1). Increases in banks’ net worth increase the optimal net debit cap in a non-
linear fashion (Proposition 2). Increases in payments flows and/or settlement times can
either increase or decrease the optimal net debit cap (Proposition 4). The presence of li-
quidity costs increases the costs associated with RTGS (Proposition 5), while the possi-
bility of asset substitution increases the likelihood of default, and therefore increases the
costs associated with net settlement (Propositions 6 and 7).
Despite these ambiguities, our analysis does have some clear policy implications
for the regulation of payment networks that settle on a net basis. First, Proposition 3 says
that to the extent that default costs can be shifted to outside parties, payment network
participants have an incentive to maximize this subsidy by setting as large a net debit as
is feasible. This result would therefore be consistent with the “Lamfalussy standards” set
26forth in Bank for International Settlements (1990), which require payment networks to
share in the costs of potential defaults by posting collateral sufficient to cover the maxi-
mum net debit of any single payment network member. Second, our analysis clearly
shows that in comparing various settlement rules, the risk of a default is an endogenous
variable and should not be taken parametrically. Finally, Propositions 6 and 7 show that
the welfare costs associated with suboptimal settlement schemes are not limited to liquid-
ity costs and/or the costs of default. When settlement rules distort banks’ investment de-
cisions, losses in allocational efficiency can also result.
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